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THE OF BUSiNESS ECONOMICS in the Department of Com-
merce and the Securities and Exchange Commission have, since
World War II, been compiling data on anticipated as well as actual
capital outlays by business. Early each quarter a sample of firms is
asked to report plant and equipment expenditures for the quarter
just past and planned expenditures for the current and for the suc-
ceeding quarter. Annually, at the year-end, these firms are also asked
to report their anticipations of both capital outlays and sales for the
following year.1
This paper makes use of these data to analyze the differences be-
tween the plant and equipment expenditures planned by business
and those actually made, in order' to appraise the accuracy with
which businessmen anticipate their capital outlays, as well as to
cast some light on the nature of investment decisions. Attention
will be given not only to the aggregate discrepancies between actual
and anticipated expenditures but also to the discrepancies of indi-
vidual companies. The latter will be analyzed in terms of the type
of company involved, the size and form of investment, and the
cyclical and other characteristics of the period covered.
For 1949 a special questionnaire was sent to a sample of com-
panies asking them to indicate the reasons for differences between
When this paper was prepared, Mr. Friend was Chief of the Business Struc-
ture Division, Office of Business Economics, Department of Commerce. Mrs.
Bronfenbrenner was on leave from the University of Illinois, which made funds
available to assist in certain phases of this research. However, the authors alone
are responsible for this report.
1Thesample firms regularly responding in the survey Consist of close to 1,000
registeredcorporations in all industries reporting each quarter to the Securities
and Exchange Commission and more than 1,100 nonregistered manufacturing
companies, noncorporate as well as corporate, reporting to the Office of Business
Economics. On the basis of these reports totals are estimated for all nonagri-
cultural business by major industry groups and arepubliclyreleased as a regular
quarterly series.
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actual and anticipated expenditures.2 The results of this survey
provide, for the first time, fairly comprehensive direct information
on the factors which motivate changes in business investment de-
cisions.
Much of the analysis contained in this paper was presented
earlier by the authors in the December 1950 issue of the Survey of
Current Business. The main addition to the previous material lies in
a more comprehensive analysis of the quarterly data, though some
further study has been made of the discrepancies. between annual
anticipations and expenditures.
While it is already possible to draw certain tentative conclusions
as to, the usefulness of anticipatory data in projecting expenditures,
it should be emphasized that the analysis is exploratory in scope and
that the period covered does not include even one complete cycle.
Moreover, the initial questionnaire relating to businessmen's rea-
Sons for departing from their investment plans was found to have a
number of deficiencies which it is hoped can be corrected in future
surveys of this type.
This paper was written in the summer of 1951; and while certain
basic aspects of the analysis have been brought up to date, it was
not generally feasible to incorporate 1951 and 1952 data.
A. Summary
It appears from the available evidence that anticipatory data on
plant and equipment expenditures provide a useful tool for short-
term projections of aggregate capital outlays both in dollar and,
more particularly, in real terms. The most important reasons for
this are, first, that investment decisions as reflected in business pro-
grams involve commitments some time in advance, and, second, that
many of the factors which modify these decisions for individual
firms tend to offset each other in the aggregate. For individual
firms as well as for aggregates, projections of expenditures based on
investment programs give better results on the average than alterna-
tive procedures.
Apart from random influences that offset each other in their
effect on investment programs of different firms, there are cyclical
factors which tend to make actual expenditures somewhat higher
or lower than those anticipated, depending on the direction of
2Asecond questionnaire, relating to the reasons for differences between
actual expenditures in 1949 and anticipated expenditures for 1950, was sent to
another sample of firms.,
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movement in economic conditions. In addition there is some tend-
ency toward systematic understatement in the expenditure plans
reported by business, largely as a result of the omission of many
small items of capital outlay and the exclusion of items whose ac-
quisition is uncertain. By making appropriate adjustments for these
factors, projections based on anticipations can be improved, but ad-
ditional data for other periods will be required before the magni-
tude of these adjustments can be determined at different stages of
the cycle. The quarterly anticipations have provided a useful adjunct
to the annual data in making adjustments for sharp changes in the
economic situation.
There is a wide disparity in the accuracy with which individual
businessmen anticipate their capital outlays, though in the aggre-
gate the positive and negative discrepancies tend to cancel out. The
degree of accuracy is related to many different factors, including
size of firm, amount of investment, and age of existing assets. The
largest firms are much more accurate in their anticipations than the
smallest firms. Similarly, firms planning large-scale investment (rela-
tive to existing assets) perform better than those planning minor
expenditures. It is also interesting to note that where existing plant
and equipment is relatively old, firms are less likely substantially to
curtail their planned expenditures.
A regression analysis relating deviations from investment pro-
grams to concurrent changes in the firm's operating experience and
financial position did not disclose any statistically significant rela-
tionships in the postwar years. Changes in sales and earnings,
whether these were anticipated or unanticipated, seem to have had
only a slight effect in this period on the realization of annual invest-
ment programs for most firms. The same thing is true of changes in
the firm's liquid position and of changes in the ratio of unfilled or-
ders to sales, which might be taken as a measure of pressure on
capacity as well as an indication of future earnings.
The absence of significant overall relationships between changes
in sales or earnings and the deviations from investment plans is due
in part to the unusual backlog of demand for capital goods during
these years, but also reflects the complexity of factors affecting
investment decisions. Even .within this period, however, there were
a number of firms for which movements in sales and earnings did
exercise a decisive influence on investment programs.
The special questionnaire sent to a sample of companies showing
large percentage differences between actual and anticipated ex-
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penditures in 1949 indicates that for these firmschangesin the
sales and in the earnings outlook accounted for nearly half of the
cases where actual expenditures in 1949 were lower than those
anticipated. These two factors were also given as reasons for in-
creasing expenditures, but in a much smaller proportion of the cases.
Of the many other factors resulting in downward revisions in
planned outlays, probably the single most important was a change
in working capital requirements.
The most significant factors listed as tending to make expenditures
exceed plans were changes in the plant and equipment supply situ-
ation, changes in plant and equipment costs, competitive conditions,
new products, and the failure to report small capital outlays and
items whose acquisition was regarded as uncertain. These factors
were mentioned as the principal motivating forces by 78 per cent
of the firms with expenditures higher than planned, but by only
28 per cent of the firms with lower expenditures.
Though.there were significant changes during 1949 in the availa-
bility of external financing, the questionnaire response indicates that
this was not important in altering planned outlays on plant and
equipment. Technological developments were only moderately more
influential.
In general it appears that a sizable proportion of the changes in
planned outlays on plant and equipment are attributable to factors
whose impact is determined by cyclical influences, but there are
other important factors which are largely independent of the level
of business activity.
B. Role of Investment
It may be worth while to consider briefly the reasons for the great
interest shown in the series on actual and anticipated plant and
equipment expenditures, which in the few years since its inception
has been widely used in the analysis of economic trends and has
become one of the best-known business barometers.
The long-term role of investment in adding to the nation's stock of
capital, in raising productivity, and in contributing a major share
to the secular rise in the standard of living is of fundamental im-
portance to the economy, and the OBE—SEC series provides the
only comprehensive breakdown of such investment by industry
group. However, even more attention in recent years has been given
to the important and partly autonomous role of investment in the
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cyclical determination of income, and it is this aspect of investment
activity with which the present paper is concerned.
Since capital outlays make considerable use of external financing
and since they depend on business expectations, which in turn re-
flect many factors not closely connected with current income, it may
be argued that these outlays exercise a more independent influence.
upon income than does consumption, the other major type of private
expenditure. Furthermore, investment is more subject than con-
sumption to large percentage variations from year to year, because
of the postponability of capital expenditures, the volatile nature of
certain elements affecting profit expectations, and, again, the im-
portance of external financing.
Empirically, the movements in fixed business investments are
found to correspond closely in timing and direction with such com-
prehensive measures of business activity as the gross national prod-
uct. This in itself lends interest to the prediction of investment, even
independently of the theoretical considerations indicated above.
The series on anticipated plant and equipment expenditures
should be expected to provide some advance insight into the course
of capital outlays, if only because the investment decisions reflected
therein ordinarily involve commitments some time in advance of
expenditures. These commitments may take the form of orders ac-
tually placed or of arrangements for raising funds if the project is
to be financed externally. Moreover, the time and effort expended in
the mechanics of arriving at (or altering) a decision contribute
a certain resistance to change. However, investment decisions are
obviously not completely binding, and various factors play a part
in modifying them.
Investment programs are affected not only by the factors determin-
ing a firm's demand for capital goods, but also by those determining
the supply of such goods. The supply situation is, however, less
subject to the control of the individual firm.
On the demand bide, investment decisions are largely a reflection
of discounted profit expectations, with due regard to the uncertainty
with which these expectations are held and due allowance for the
expected cost of financing. At times, of course, funds may not be
available on virtually any terms. The expected rate of return on
investment, which in turn reflects estimated sales and fixed and
variable costs, depends on many different variables, including the
level of and the rate of change in sales, orders, utilization of Ca-
prices and costs, and technological and institutional develop-
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ments. It is affected, though not completely determined, by past
experience.
An investment decision in response to a given expected rate of
return and cost of financing may further depend on various aspects
of the financial condition of the business, including its liquidity and
debt-equity position. It will also be influenced by other noneco-
nomic as well as economic characteristics of the firm and period, in
particular those affecting the degree of confidence or certainty with
which the firm is able to appraise its prospects.
When actual investment of an individual firm deviates signifi-
cantly from that planned, it may reflect a divergence between actual
conditions and expectations with respect to the factors mentioned
above as determining demand, or it may indicate that the supply
situation is different from that anticipated. For firms in the ag-
gregate it would be expected that many, though not all, of these
reasons for differences between actual and anticipated expenditures
would offset each other. An indication of the extent to which there
is such offsetting is presented in the next section.
C. Aggregate Expenditures—Actual versus Anticipated
1. ANNUAL COMPARISON
Actual and anticipated aggregate expenditures on new plant and
equipment for the years 1947-1952 are compared in table 1 and
chart 1. The table gives the data by major industry groups as
well as all-industry totals. It should be noted that the fixed invest-
ment of new firms is not included in these aggregates in the period
1947-1950, although it is contained in the revised series used for
1951 and 1952.
It is evident that the degree of accuracy with which businessmen
have anticipated their actual outlays in the past has varied con-
siderably both by industries and, more importantly, by years. In
1947—the first calendar year for which planned outlays were re-
ported—actual expenditures were 16 per cent higher than those
anticipated at the beginning of the year, while in 1948 and 1949
the differences were reduced to 3 per cent and 1 per cent, respec-
tively. In 1950 actual expenditures were again considerably above
those anticipated, the difference amounting to 15 per cent. In 1951
and 1952 the deviations from program were very small, amounting
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patory data do not offer an outstanding improvement over projec-
tions based on actual first-quarter expenditures, it should be re-
membered that they are available a full quarter earlier.
Anticipatory data were also found to be more reliable than any
usual extrapolation of past data, such as adjusting current expendi-
tures. by the rate of change in such expenditures, or estimating
prospective outlays from lagged profits. For example, the 1919-1941
linear regression between plant and equipment expenditures and
corporate profits after taxes, lagged six months, would underestimate
expenditures by more than 40 per cent on the average if applied in
the postwar years. Obviously, it may be possible to stipulate some
mechanical procedure for extrapolating past data which would per-
form better than anticipated outlays in projecting expenditures for
the postwar years, but to the knowledge of the authors no procedure
suggested independently of the actual expenditure figures achieves
this result.
The fact remains, however, that the accuracy of investment pro-
jections based on anticipated outlays is not very satisfactory in
1947 and 1950. In 1947 this result may be explainable in part by the
newness of the survey and in part by an unanticipated easing of
supplies and elimination of restrictions on nonresidential construc-
tion; in 1950 the Korean war—which could riot be foreseen by busi-
nessmen at the beginning of the year—played a major, though not
exclusive, role in the change in the investment picture.
Probably the most encouraging aspect of the comparative data
cited above is the indicated ability of the anticipated expenditures
to project correctly a downward movement in actual outlays at the
cyclical turning point which occurred at the beginning of 1949. A
number of projection procedures give satisfactory results so long
as there is no substantial change in economic trends, but the real
test of a projection lies in its performance when changes do occur.
Moreover, in the first quarter of 1948 businessmen correctly antici-
pated an increase in expenditures in spite of the weakening in
prices and orders at that time.3 In 1948, 1949, and 1951 virtually
every industry was able to indicate whether its outlays would rise
or decline during the year—the one exception being a rather small
group.
Similarly, a special survey early in 1945 gave evidence that businessmen
planned to make large capital outlays in the first postwar year, at a time when
there was considerable uncertainty about the immediate postwar trend and the
extent of the expected decline in business activity. See D. Stevens Wilson,
'Planned Capital Outlays by Manufacturers," Survey .of Current Business (De-
partment of Commerce), June 1945, pp. 5-9.
61PLANT AND EQUIPMENT PROGRAMS
2. QUARTERLY COMPARISON
The quarterly anticipations provide a useful adjunct to the annual
data, particularly when the economic situation changes rapidly.
Thus in 1950 they depicted in advance the substantial upsurge in
capital outlays in the second half of the year.
Since businessmen are requested quarterly to supply their esti-
mated outlays for the current as well as for the following quarter,
there are really two series of anticipated quarterly expenditures—
the first anticipations, reported, generally, somewhat more than a
full quarter in advance, and the second anticipations, reported in
the early weeks of the quarter to which they refer. Except when
sudden changes occur in the economic situation, neither set of
quarterly anticipations gives appreciably more accurate approxima-
tions of aggregate expenditures than do projections for an entire
year. Moreover, when tested against the other methods of projecting
outlays, the quarterly anticipations do not fare much better than
do the annual anticipations. The second series of quarterly anticipa-
tions furnishes somewhat better results than the first set.
The performance. of the quarterly anticipations may be consider-
ably improved, however, by introducing a seasonal correction. It
appears, for example, that businessmen fail to allow fully for the
seasonal rise in plant and equipment expenditures which occurs in
the fourth quarter and which apparently reflects the concentration
of certain charges to capital accounts in the end-of-year statements.
Thus there is a systematic tendency to underestimate expenditures
in this quarter, and improved may be obtained if anticipa-
tions are adjusted upward by a suitable seasonal factor.
Seasonal adjustments of the anticipatory data, based on systematic
tendencies to under- or overestimate in particular quarters, have
been carried out for manufacturing, though not for the all-industry
total. When the anticipatory data are seasonally corrected, the sec-
ond anticipation appears to yield significantly more accurate pro-
jections than either the first anticipation or a simple extension of
seasonally adjusted current outlays. -
Whenthe performance of the seasonally adjusted anticipatory
series is appraised on the basis of regression analysis, a correlation
of 0.96 is obtained between actual expenditures and the second
anticipation, compared with 0.85 when the seasonally adjusted actual
expenditures of the previous quarter are used as the explanatory
variable. The first anticipation shows, a 'systematic tendency to un-
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derestimate by about 10 per cent, but when this is allowed for, its
predictive performance is relatively good, as evidenced by a correla-
tion of 0.92 with actual
3. REASONS FOR DISCREPANCIES
Both annual and quarterly surveys suggest that movements in
capital goods prices are an important factor in departures from
projected dollar expenditures on plant and equipment. Thus the
price rises for capital goods might have been responsible for as
much as half in 1947 and one-third in 1950 of the discrepancies be-
tween actual and anticipated expenditures for those years. In 1948
and 1949 the price movements were again in the same direction as,
but proportionately even larger than, the discrepancies between
actual and anticipated expenditures. On a quarterly basis, business-
men in their first anticipations tended to overestimate their outlays
during the few quarters in which prices declined and to underesti-
mate their outlays in other periods. It is quite possible, therefore,
that anticipated outlays to a considerable extent reflect a planned
physical volume of investment valued at prevailing prices, and hence
do not sufficiently take account of price factors.
There are two other sets of factors, apart from random miscalcula-
tions, which may cause actual expenditures to diverge from expecta-
tions. First, changes in economic conditions obviously have some
effect on investment plans totally aside from their influence on the
prices of capital goods. Second, even if economic conditions are
assumed to conform to expectations, some systematic understate-
ment might be expected in anticipated fixed-capital outlays reported
for any period well in the future, since to the extent that business-
men are uncertain about their plans they are probably more likely
to omit than to include their more tentative projects. Thus the
greater understatement of actual expenditures in the second half of
the year than in the first half, as indicated by the quarterly and
annual anticipations reported at the beginning of the year, may be
clue at least in part to the fact that future programs are more incom-
plete than near-term budgets. Further, discrepancies between actual
Letting Xi he actual expenditures,andthe seasonally adjusted second
and first anticipations, and x4 actual expenditures in the previous quarter, sea-
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and anticipated expenditures may reflect not only modification of
investment plans by individual companies but also differences in
the samples used in deriving aggregate estimates, since not all firms
reporting actual outlays also reported anticipated outlays.
D. Individual Company Expenditures—Actual versus
Anticipated
The following sections compare actual and anticipated expendi-
tures on an individual company basis to obtain information which
cannot be derived from the aggregate figures. The analysis will be
confined for the most to data for manufacturing firms, since
the sample of respondents is largest for this group.
The accuracy with which individual firms anticipate their plant
and equipment expenditures is of interest from several points of
view. First, it is important to determine whether the relatively close
agreement between expenditures and anticipations in the aggregate
is the result of accurate planning by individual firms or whether it
relies heavily on offsets between large positive and negative errors.
In the latter case the reliability of the predictions over time will
depend on the stability of the forces which bring about a balance
between positive and negative discrepancies. Second, an analysis of
the individual discrepancies makes it possible to determine whether
anticipations are more accurate for certain groups of firms and cer-
tain types of investment than for others, and this may lead to im-
provement of projection procedures. Third, any information regard-
ing the firmness of individual cOmpanies' investment programs con-
tributes to knowledge of the behavior of the firm and is useful in
the study of investment decisions.
1. PERCENTAGE DEVIATIONS FROM ANTICIPATED INVESTMENT
Table 2 and chart 2 show the frequency distribution of per cent
deviations of annual expenditures from anticipations for 941 manu-
facturing firms which reported both figures for Unless other-
wise indicated, figures for individual firms throughout this section
will include expenditures for used as well as new plant and equip-
ment, although the aggregate figures refer to new only. In 1949,
purchases of used capital goods constituted a very small proportion
This includes all of the reporting firms for which either actual or anticipated
expenditures exceeded $10,000. Where smaller amounts than this were involved
it was felt that the per cent change might be a misleading measure of the ac-
curacy of the anticipations.
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TABLE 2
Frequency Distribution of Percentage Deviations of Actual from Anticipated
Expenditures for Plant and Equipment, Manufacturing Firms, 1949
Per C
from A
ent Change of Actual
nticipated Expenditures
Number
















































200 and over 113 12.0
Total 941 100.0
Sources: Office of Business Economics, Department of Commerce; Securities
and Exchange Commission. Table includes all reporting firms for which either
actual or anticipated expenditures exceeded $10,000. Anticipated expenditures
were reported by business between mid-January and mid-March 1949.
of the total. As elsewhere in this section, similar results have been
obtained for 1948 and 1947, but only the 1949 figures are presented.
The only noteworthy difference in the earlier years occurs in 1947,
when the distribution is shifted to the right, indicating a stronger
tendency for expenditures to exceed anticipations.
A considerable degree of dispersion is indicated by the figures
in table 2. Only a little more than one-fourth of the firms came
within 20 per. cent of their anticipations, while over one-fifth spent
more than twice, and one-tenth spent less than half, the amount
planned. Thus such accuracy as the aggregate projections achieve
appears to depend on offsets between underestimates and overesti-
mates and on the fact (to be discussed later) that large firms and
firms projecting major capital outlays performed substantially bet-
ter than the average (see tables 4 and 7).°
°Whereasset data were available it was found that firms with total assets
exceeding $50 million constituted only 6 per cent of the firms in the extreme.
intervals (i.e. with expenditures less than half or more than twice the amount
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Chart2. Frequency Distribution of Percentage Deviations of Actual from
Anticipated Expenditures for Plant and Equipment, Manufacturing Firms, 1949
Even for individual firms, however, the figures in table 2 do not
give a complete picture of the accuracy of anticipations. In many
cases a large percentage discrepancy between actual and antici-
pated investment may represent an expenditure which is very
minor from the point of view of the firm in question. Thus when
the discrepancy is related to the firm's gross fixed assets, it is not
ordinarily found to constitute a substantial percentage of this base.
For the 513 reporting firms for which information on gross fixed
assets was readily available almost half of the discrepancies amount-
ed to less than 2 per cent of gross fixed assets, while over 70 per
cent amounted to less than 4 per cent. In only 7 per cent of the
cases did the discrepancy exceed 10 per cent of gross fixed assets.
As in the case of the aggregate figures, projections based on an-
ticipations were found to perform better than projections based on
extrapolation of past data. This is true whether dollar discrepancies
or per cent discrepancies between actual expenditures and projec-
tions are considered.
planned), compared with 21 per cent of those in other intervals. Firms with
planned expenditures exceeding 10 per cent of gross fixed assets constituted
17 per cent of the firms in the extreme intervals, compared with 33 per cent of
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Table 3 shows a two-way frequency distribution of the percent-
age deviations of actual from anticipated expenditures compared
with the percentage deviations for the same companies of actual
expenditures from outlays in the previous year.
TABLE 3
Two-Way Frequency Distribution of Percentage Deviations of Actual from
Anticipated Expenditures for Plant and Equipment and from Actual







Per CentChange inActualExpendituresfrom Previous Year
—50.0 or—49.9 to—19.9to20 to 100 or
Anticipations Under —20.0 19.9 99.9 Over Total
—50.0 or under 21 6 0 0 1 28
—49.9 to —20.0 34 27 10 5 2 78
—19.9 to 19.9 30 42 41 21 9 143
20.0 to 99.9 24 25 27 30 14 120
100.0 or over 13 10 22 14 9 68
Total 122 110 100 70 35 437
Sources: Office of Business Economics, Department of Commerce; Securities
and Exchange Commission.
The performance of the anticipatory data is clearly superior not
only in terms of the frequency with which relatively accurate pro-
jections are obtained but also in terms of the greater symmetry of
the distribution, with underestimates and overestimates tending to
balance each other. The relative frequency of accurate anticipations
is greatest when there was little change in actual expenditures from
the previous year. The greatest symmetry occurs when actual ex-
penditures were lower than in the previous year. In other words,
when a decline in actual expenditures occurred, firms were about
as likely to underestimate as to overestimate this decline in making
their anticipations, but when expenditures rose, the increase was
not in general foreseen and of actual expenditures
were the rule.
If in the above comparison expenditures in the previous year are
replaced by expenditures in the first quarter of the current year or
in the fourth quarter of the previous year, at seasonally adjusted
annual rates, the results are found to favor the anticipatory data
even more strongly. It appears that for individual companies, out-
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lays for the entire previous year provide a definitely more satis-
factory basis for projection than do current quarterly expenditures,
at least so long as seasonal factors for the individual firms are not
available and the overall seasonal adjustment, which is quite inap-
propriate in. certain cases, must be applied.
When extrapolations based on current outlays are compared with
anticipatory data on the basis of dollar variations from actual ex-
penditures, the performance of the latter is again superior. For
example, the anticipated expenditures came within $20,000 of the
actual outlay in one-third of the cases, while projections based on
the previous year's expenditures came this close in only one-fourth
of the cases. Similarly, the discrepancies from anticipations ex-
ceeded $1 million in only 8 per cent of the cases, compared with
12 per cent when the alternative projection was used. The tendency
for positive and negative discrepancies to balance out is again found
to be much stronger for the projections based on anticipatory data.
The quarterly plant and equipment data were studied along the
same lines as were the annual figures. This analysis was carried out
primarily for the third quarter of 1949 and covers those of the
firms studied in the annual analysis which reported full information
for this particular quarter. In addition small sample checks were
made for several other quarters in the postwar period.
The frequency distribution of quarterly per cent deviations from
second anticipations is very similar to the distribution of annual per
cent changes shown in table 2 and chart 2. Of °.the 679 firms includ-
ed, slightly more than one-fourth came within 20 per cent of their
second anticipation, while one-fifth spent more than twice, and one-
sixth less than half, the amount planned.
When the first anticipation is considered, the distribution shows
somewhat more dispersion and in particular a larger number of
cases in which expenditures were very substantially underestimated.
Between one-fourth and one-fifth of the companies came within
20 per cent of their first anticipation, while 27 per cent spent more
than twice, and 17 per cent less than half, as much as anticipated.
The inaccuracies involved in the quarterly anticipations—particu-
larly the second set—may be due in considerable degree to diffi-
culties in programming the deliveries of, and consequently the
outlays on, capital goods already on order. However, the attempts
made to test this hypothesis proved inconclusive.
When the predictive performance of the quarterly anticipations
is compared with that of projections based on the seasonally ad-
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justed actual expenditures in the previous quarter in a two-way
table similar to table 3, the results are somewhat in favor of the
anticipations, though the difference is not so marked as for the
annual data and is less obvious for the first than for the second
anticipation. The greater tendency of under- and overestimates to
balance out in the case of projections based on the anticipatory data
is again very evident.
2. TENDENCY TO UNDERESTIMATE EXPENDITURES
As indicated in table 2, substantially more than half (59 per cent)
of the firms underestimated their annual expenditures. Since 1949
was a year of moderate decline in economic activity, in which about
three-fifths of the reporting firms fell short of their sales anticipa-
tions, the understatement of expenditures by a majority of firms in
this year (as well as in previous years) indicates a systematic tend-
ency in this direction. This will be elaborated in a subsequent
section dealing with the reasons given by businessmen for departures
from their investment programs.
Despite the prevalence of cases in which individual firms exceed-
ed their anticipations, actual investment for all firms was slightly
smaller than the aggregate projection. This is primarily due to the
fact that firms with negative discrepancies represent a larger pro-
portion of aggregate investment than their number indicates; for
example, the number of negative discrepancies exceeding $1 million
is significantly larger than the number of positive discrepancies of
this size.7
In 1947 the tendency for individual firms to understate their in-
vestment programs was much more pronounced than in 1949 or
1948, reflecting the differential effect in these years of movements in
capital-goods prices as well as in other economic variables. It is in-
teresting to note that large firms and firms anticipating major ex-
penditures showed no tendency to exceed their investment programs
in either 1949 or 1948 and less tendency than other firms to do so
in 1947.
With regard to the quarterly data it appears that the first antici-
pation generally understates actual expenditures, but except
Some difficulty may alsO arise from the fact, mentioned earlier, that the
total figure for actual investment is based on a slightly different group of firms
from those on which the figure for anticipated investment is based, since some
firms report actual expenditures but fail to report anticipations.
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1947 there is no evidence of systematic underestimation in the sec-
ond anticipation.
S. INFLUENCE OF COMPANY GEIARACrEBISTICS
An attempt was' made to determine which characteristics of the
individual company appear to affect the accuracy with which in-
vestment is anticipated. The most obvious possibilities are size and
industry, both of which were tested.
a. Breakdown by size.Table4 and chart S give a breakdown by
asset size of the per cent changes of annual expenditures from an-
ticipations for those firms for which data on total assets were read-
ily available. Firms with total assets exceeding $50 million were
TABLE 4
Frequency Distribution of Percentage Deviations of Actual from Anticipated
Expenditures for Plant and Equipment, Manufacturing Firms,
by Size of Assets, 1949
• Total Assets
Per Cent $10,000,000 to







Expendituresof FirmsCent of Firms Centof FirmsCent
—100 to —80 1 0.5 0 0.0 0 0.0
—79.9 to —6010 4.5 6 2.8 1 1.1
—59.9 to —4025 11.3 14 6.6 7 7.4
—39.9 to —2025 11.3 30 14.1 16 17.0
—19,9 to 0 27 12.2 84' 16.0 30 31.9
0 to 19.9 21 9.5 37 17.4 15 16.0'
20 to 39.9 25 11.3 36 16.9 9 9.6
40 to 59.9 17 7.7 18 8.5 7 7.4
60 to 79.9 9 4.1 7 3.3 2 2.1
80 to 99.9 8 3.6 5 2.3 3 3.2
100 to 119.9 11 5.0 . 6 2.8 1 1.1
120 to 139.9 4 1.8 2 0.9 0 0.0
140 to 159.9 3 1.4 4 1.9 0 0.0
160 to 179.9 4 1.8 0 0.0 0 0.0
180 to 199.9 4 1.8 1 0.5 1 1.1
200 and over 27 12.2 13 6.1 2 2.1
Total 221 100.0 213 100.0 94 100.0
Sources: Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics; Securities
and Exchange Commission. Includes all reporting firms for which either actual
or anticipated expenditures exceeded $10,000 and for which information on
total assets at the end of 1948 was readily available. Anticipated expenditures
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considerably more accurate in their anticipations than firms with
assets between $10 million and $50 million; and these in turn were
more accurate than firms with assets less than $10 million.
There are a number of reasons why such a result might be ex-
pected. In the first place the expenditure plans of a large firm ordi-
narily involve a number of separate projects. To the extent that the
discrepancies between expenditures and antibipations for these indi-
vidual projects are random in nature there will already be cancel-
lation of positive against negative discrepancies within the firm.
Second, there are certain expenditures which occur from time to
time but which cannot be specifically foreseen In advance—for
ample, the unexpected breakdown of a piece of machinery. The
large firm will experience a number of such incidents in any given
year and, although unable to predict the individual items of ex-
penditure, will be in a position to make some blanket. allowance for
them in advance. The small firm, which has few such expenditures
in a single year, frequently will not attempt to allow for them in
advance, giving rise to a definite bias in the direction of under-
This argument as to differences in planning behavior
between large and small firms derives some empirical support from
the fact that the largest size group is the only one which
no tendency to underestimate expenditures in 1949.
Third, a large organization must make its plans further in ad-
vance than a smaller firm. The decision-making process is more
formalized; .a capital budget is more likely to exist. The number of
administrative levels which must give approval is larger. These fac-
tors contribute not only to the making of decisions well in advance
of actual expenditure but also to the inflexibility of plans when
made; and the effect is to reduce the likelihood of large deviations
from anticipations.
•In addition to influencing the accuracy of anticipations, size is
also found to affect the extent to which the anticipatory data repre-
sent, an improvement over projections. based on past outlays.. This
may be seen in table 5, which shows a size breakdown of the fre-
quency distributions of per cent deviations of actual expen4itures
both from anticipations and from actual investment in the previous
year. The anticipatory data provide a telling improvement over
extrapolation for the largest firms, substantial improvement for the
medium-sized firms, and no significant improvement fOr the smallest
firms. It may be noted that the concentration of overestimates ob-
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expenditures reflects the cyclical movement in this period, while
the concentration of underestimates obtained from anticipations
reflects the systematic tendency of the smaller, companies to under-
state expenditures.
A size breakdown of the quarterly data also shows the superior
ability of the large firms to anticipate their expenditures accurately.
The superiority of anticipatory data over projections based on cur-
rent outlays is again significant for the large and medium-sized
firms, though not for the smallest size group.
b. Breakdown by industr9. A breakdown of the annual data was
also made by industry groups within manufacturing. Seven such
groups—food, textiles, paper, chemicals, iron and steel, electrical
machinery, and machinery other than electrical—were sufficiently
well represented to permit separate analysis.
Of the industries studied, textiles (with. 84 firms), paper (with
55 finns), chemicals (with 74 firms), and iron and steel (with 137
firms) gave the best performance in terms of per cent discrepancies
from anticipations. Only food (with 95 firms) an4 machinery other
than electrical (with 121 firms) showed as much dispersion as, or
more dispersion than, the total distribution.
In contrast to the general pattern, chemicals, iron and steel, and
machinery other than electrical indicated no tendency to exceed
investment plans. In the first two cases this reflects the presence of
a high proportion of the very large firms, which showed a slight
tendency to spend less than anticipated. In the third case the tend-
ency to exceed investment plans was apparently offset by the rela-
tively sizable decline in sales and profits in 1949. Food and tex-
tiles—which were characterized by comparatively small firms and
in the case of food by relatively good profit experience—showed a
very large of positive discrepancies.
Apart from the effect of size of firm and other factors found to
be influential in their own right, there is no evidence that industry
characteristics (within the manufacturing sector) were associated
with differences in the accuracy with which expenditures were
anticipated.
4. INFLUENcE OF TYPE OF INVESTMENT
The accuracy with' which expenditure is anticipated may also
depend on the nature of the intended investment. Significant differ-
ences were found in this respect between investment in plant and
in equipment and between expenditures of major and of minor pro-
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portions (relative to gross fixed assets). There are probably further
differences in behavior depending on whether expansion, cost-
cutting, or replacement is primarily involved, but no information
was available on which to make such distinctions.
a. Plant versus equipment. Table 6 shows the per cent deviations
of actual from anticipated annual expenditures for new plant and
TABLE 6
Frequency Distribution of Percentage Deviations of Actual from Anticipated
Expenditures, Plant versus Equipment, Manufacturing Firms, 1949
New Plant New Equipment
Per Cent Change
of Actual from Number Number
Anticipated Expenditures of FirmsPer Centof FirmsPer Cent
—100 to —80 46 10.8 84 4.5
—79.9 to —60 26 6.1 32 4.2
—59.9 to —40 28 6.6 59 7.8
—39.9 to —20 41 9.6 88 11.6
—19.9 to 0 37 8.7 103 13.6
0 to 19.9 33 7.8 92 12.].
20 to 39.9 39 9.2 72 9.5
40 to 59.9 15 3.5 42 5.5
60 to 79.9 12 2.8 33 4.8
80 to 99.9 12 2.8 35 4.6
100 to 119.9 10 2.4 23 3.0
120 to 139.9 6 1.4 18 2.4
140 to 159.9 9 2.1 10 1.3
160 to 179.9 5 1.2 13 1.7
180 to 199.9 5 1.2 4 0.5
200 and over 101 23.8 102 13.4
Total 425 100.0 760 100.0
Sources: Office of Business Economics, Department of Commerce; Securities
and Exchange Commission. Included in the analysis of plant expenditures are
all reporting firms for which either actual or anticipated expenditures on plant
exceeded $10,000. A similar rule was followed with respect to equipment.
Anticipated expenditures were reported by business between mid-January and
mid-March 1949.
new equipment taken separately.8 The distribution relating to equip-
ment follows very closely the patterii for plant and equipment com-
bined.
The breakdown between plant and equipment is available for new capital
goods only. The number of firms is substantially smaller than for plant and
equipment combined, since many firms do not report plant and equipment
separately. Cases in which both anticipated and actual expenditures were less
than $10,000 are again excluded. It was not feasible to treat plant and equip-
ment separately for any year except 1949.
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Anticipations of expenditure for plant, however, are definitely
less accurate than for equipment, in spite of the fact that construc-
tion requires relatively firm commitments for a considerable period
in advance of expenditure. This may be partly explained by the
fact that investment in plant is normally a much more discrete
process than investment in equipment. For many firms the decision
is either to build some particular structure involving a substantial
capital outlay, or not to build it, with no half-way measures feasible.
Thus when changes in plans occur, they are likely to be big, and it
is not surprising that a considerable proportion of cases fall in the
extreme intervals of the frequency distribution. Almost a third of
the firms spent more than twice as much on plant as anticipated,
while over a fifth spent less than half the amount planned.
•The large number of firms exceeding plans by more than 100
per cent may also reflect the fact that in any given year many
firms plan virtually no plant expenditure. Then if minor plant. re-
pairs unexpectedly become necessary, the resulting small expendi-
tures rank large percentagewise. It is pointed out below that plant
anticipations are substantially less accurate for small programs than
for large. For the quarterly data as well as the annual it was found
that expenditures for new plant were much less likely to be ac-
curately anticipated than outlays for new' equipment.
b. Scale of investment. Table 7 shows a breakdown between
firms which planned investment on a major scale—exceeding 10
per cent of gross fixed assets—and those which anticipated rela-
tively minor expenditures. Anticipations are considerably more
accurate in the former case: 43 per cent of the firms spent within
20per cent of anticipations, while only 12 per cent spent less than
half or more than twice as much as anticipated. When, smaller ex-
pénditures were planned, 26 per cent fell in the range of high ac-
curacy, and 26 per cent in the extreme intervals. Within the group
of firms anticipating minor outlays, the least satisfactory results
were obtained when the investment program amounted to less than
5 per cent of fixed assets.9
These results suggest that major investments may be more care-
fully planned than others, for longer periods in advance. There is,
It is interesting 'that the relevant variable appears to be the size of the
program relative to the existing assets of the firm, rather than the absolute size
of the program. It was found that, within a given dollar range, the major or
moderate programs of small or medium-sized firms came closer to actual
expenditures than did the small programs of large firms—in spite of the generally
higher accuracy of the large firms.
76PLANT AND EQUIPMENT PROGRAMS
TABLE 7
Frequency Distribution of Percentage Changes in Investment Plans, Classified
by Ratio of Anticipated Expenditures to Gross Fixed Assets,
Manufacturing Firms, 1949
Anticipated Expenditure Relative to
Gross Fixed Assets
Greater than 10 Less than 10
Per Cent Change
of Actual from
Per Cent Per Cent
Number Number
Anticipated Expenditures of FirmsPer Centof FirmsPer Cent
—100 to —80 0 0.O 0 0.0
—79.9 to —60 4 2.6 12 3.3
—59.9 to —40 16 10.5 28 7.8
—39.9 to —20 24 15.7 45 12.5
—19.9 to 0 34 22.2 55 15.3
0 to 19.9 32 20.9 40 11.1
20 to 39.9 20 13.1 49 13.6
40 to 59.9 9 5.9 32 8.9
60 to 79.9 3 2.0 15 4.2
80 to 99.9 2 1.3 14 3.9
100 to 119.9 4 2.6 13 3.6
120 to 139.9 1 0.7 5 1.4
140 to 159.9 0 0.0 7 1.9
160 to 179.9 1 0.7 2 0.6
180 to 199.9 1 0.7 5 1.4
200 and over 2 1.3 38 10.6
Total 153 100.0 360 100.0
Sources: Office of Business Economics, Department of Commerce; Securities
and Exchange Commission. Table includes all reporting firms for which either
actual or anticipated expenditures exceeded $10,000 and for which assets data
at the end of 1948 were readily available. Anticipated expenditures were re-
ported by business between mid-January and mid-March 1949.
of course, considerable correlation between the asset size of firms
and the scale of anticipated investment relative to gross fixed as-
sets; but even within asset-size groups anticipations were found to
be more- accurate when major expenditures were planned. For
firms with assets over $50 million 54 per cent of those projecting
major expenditures fell within the range of high accuracy, com-
pared with 40 per cent of those planning minor expenditures; and
comparable differences occurred in the other two size groups. In
all size groups a smaller proportion of firms fell in the extreme inter-
vals when major rather than minor expenditures were projected.;
and for all but the largest firms the difference was substantial.
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For firms projecting minor expenditures the deviations from plan,
in addition to being relatively large, are apparently nonrandom in
nature. These firms showed a systematic tendency toward invest-
ing more than was planned, while firms anticipating major capital
outlays showed little evidence of such a tendency, at least in 1949.
The same pattern held true within asset-size groups for small and
medium-sized firms, though large firms showed no tendency to ex-
ceed projected expenditures even when these were small relative
to existing assets.
When plant and equipment expenditures are considered sep-
arately for firms with major and firms with minor investment pro-
grams, it appears that the accuracy of equipment anticipations in-
creases very little when major outlays are planned, but the accuracy
of plant anticipations improves strikingly. When major programs
are involved, plant expenditures are almost as accurately antici-
pated as those for equipment, though they continue to show a sig-
nificantly higher frequency of cases in which outlays were more
than twice or less than half as much as planned.1°
A comparison of investment anticipations with projections based
on outlays in the previous year for firms planning different scales of
investment shows that for firms with programs exceeding 10 per
cent of gross fixed assets the anticipatory data are notably more
accurate. The superiority of anticipations for firms planning invest-
ment between 5 and 10 per cent of gross fixed assets is almost as
great, but there is little difference in accuracy between the two
methods of projection when outlays less than 5 per cent of gross
fixed assets are planned.
On a quarterly basis a somewhat different picture emerges when
the performance of second anticipations is examined. Anticipations
are again more accurate for firms planning investment on a major
or moderate scale—that is, exceeding 2.5 per cent or in the range
between 1 and 2.5 per cent of gross fixed assets,. respectively—than
for firms with relatively small programs. However, in this instance
there is little difference between firms planning major and those
planning moderate capital outlays; and, more important, the antici-
In studying the effect of scale of planned investment upon the accuracy
of anticipated plant expenditures,it would be somewhat more relevant to
classify firms by size of planned expenditure on plant (rather than by size of
total investment program) relative to existing fixed assets. However, such a
test would be considerably more difficult to make than the one actually carried
out and should yield similar results.
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pations of firms with programs of intermediate size show greater
improvement in accuracy over projections based on seasonally ad-
justed expenditures in the previous quarter than occurs for firms
planning larger outlays. The firms planning very substantial ex-
penditures in a single quarter showed a strong tendency to fall
short of anticipations.
5.OTHERINFLUENCES
There are, of course, a large number of other classifications of
companies which would be relevant in appraising the accuracy of
the anticipatory data. In' the above discussion, attention has been
confined to those classifications of type of company and type of
investment which are available at the time the capital program is
prepared and which, while they do not provide moti-
vation for departures from plan, may affect the susceptibility of the
firm's program to revision in response to subsequent events. Other
breakdowns of this type which it was feasible to test crudely (for
one year only) include pressure on productive capacity at the be-
ginning of the period, condition of the existing stock of capital, pre-
vious profit record, liquidity at the beginning of, the period, and
whether or not it was planned to make use of external financing.
However, a number of bases' for classification that would have
been properly included in the present section have not been cov-
ered because of the unavailability of data. These include such con-
siderations as the mechanics of the firm's decision-making process—
the existence of a formal capital budget, for instance. Certain rele-
vant classifications based on changes occurring after the formulation
of investment plans are analyzed in the final section, which deals
with statistical relationships between discrepancies and explanatory
variables. ,
Threeof the further breakdowns which were tested—based on
pressure on productive capacity at the beginning of the period,
profit history, and liquidity at the beginning of the period—did not
show any significant relationship between these characteristics and
accuracy of anticipations. The tests involved in the first instance
the ratio of unfilled orders to sales at the beginning of the period
compared with the prewar ratio, in the second instance the rate of
return on invested capital in the previous three years, and in the
third instance the ratio of liquid assets to sales at the beginning of
the period compared with a prewar norm. These tests were not
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completely satisfactory in terms of either the measures used or the
size of the sample."
The condition of the individual firm's existing stock of capital,
as regards both physical repair and obsolescence, would be expect-
ed to indicate in some degree the urgency of proposed expenditures.
Though direct information on this point was not available, a rough
measure of the relative newness of capital assets at the beginning
of 1949 was obtained by examining the size of capital outlays in
the period 1946-1948 in relation to 1948 gross fixed assets. Where
the proportion of recent expenditures was small, it was expected
that replacement needs would be relatively urgent and that this
would tend to diminish the probability of substantial curtailment
of projected expenditures..
The firms for which postwar investment amounted to less than
30 per cent of gross fixed assets showed a somewhat higher ac-
curacy in anticipating 1949 outlays than did firms with larger rela-
tive expenditures in 1946-1948. More striking is the fact that a much
smaller proportion of the former of the latter group showed
negative discrepancies of more than 20 per cent.12 The results ob-
tained here are subject to certain limitations, first because of the
smallness of the sample involved, and second because the book
value of gross fixed assets is not a particularly adequate measure
of a firm's existing stock of capital. More work along these lines, to
correct these deficiencies, would appear to be warranted.
With regard to whether firms planned the use of external funds
in financing their investment programs as formulated at the begin-
fling of the year, it was again impossible to obtain direct inforrna-
tion. However, this was assumed .to be the case for the beginning
of 1949 whenever new securities were issued for plant and equip-
ment purposes in the last quarter of 1948 or the first three quarters
of 1949. Information on the use of bank loans for this purpose was
not readily available. It may be expected that the commitments
involved in raising outside funds increase the rigidity of invest-
ment programs thus financed.
Since there is a close interrelation between size of firm and the
11 A subsequent test, involving a small sample of firms with very high ratios
of unfilled orders to sales (compared with a prewar norm), indicates that an
abnormally high level of unfilled orders may have some effect in increasing the
probability that programs will be exceeded and in decreasing the frequency of
curtailments.
12 The difference between the two groups is too large to be explained on the
basis of size of firm.
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use of external financing, this test could be carried out oniywithin
asset-size groups and was in fact made only for the largest group
(with assets exceeding $50 million). New securities, to finance plant
and equipment expenditures were issued in the relevant period by
10 of the 94 largest companies. Of these 10 companies, 6 came
within 15 per cent of anticipations, and the largest'deviation amount-
ed to 26 per cent. Performance within the group did not appear to
be correlated with the size of the investment program relative to
gross fixed assets, though in all cases fairly substantial programs
were involved. The record of these 10 firms is better than the rec-
ord of the remaining firms in this size group that planned invest-
ment on a comparable scale, but the nature of the sample is not
such as to permit any definitive conclusions.
A final test was made to determine whether the same firms tend
to anticipate accurately in successive years. Apart from the effects
of size and other considerations already noted, there was no evi-
dence of such a tendency.
E. Reasons'f or Changes in Investment Plan.s
As previously mentioned,aspecialfollow-upquestionnaire
(which is reproduced in the Appendix to this p.aper) was sent to a
sample of companies early in 1950 with a request that they indicate
the reasons for differences between actual and anticipated expendi-
tures in 1949. The questionnaire was sent to most survey firms whose
actual outlays on plant and equipment during 1949 differed by.
more than 25 per cent from the expenditures anticipated at the be.
ginning of the year.13 Replies were received from 868, or 84 per cent,
of the 440 companies contacted. Of these responses, the 305 in
manufacturing are analyzed below.
1. CHEcK LIST
After a pretest of alternative procedures, the companies were
given a check list of the more important conditions which might
have differed from' expectations and were asked to designate the
principal factor and other major factors responsible for the discrep-
ancy between actual and anticipated expenditures. The list included
changes in the sales outlook, current expenses, net earnings, work-
13Thisquestionnaire wassent to all the firms in this group since it was
necessary to obtain other information from some of them and it wasnotdesired
to burden any firm unduly. Moreover, if actual expenditures were under ,$5,000,
a questionnaire was sent only if the discrepancy was in excess of $1,000.
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ing capital requirements, plant and equipment supply situation,
plant and equipment costs (namely, prices paid), availability and
cost, of debt financing, availability and cost of equity capital, and
other factors (technology, competitive conditions, unfilled orders,
and so on). It was realized that not all these factors were inde-
pendent in their influence on investment decisions—for example,
changes in the sales outlook or in expenses usually involve changes
in the earnings outlook—but it was desired to determine the relative
emphases placed on these factors by businessmen themselves.
In addition the respondents were requested to indicate what the
reason was for the difference between actual and anticipated outlays
in cases where it was not due to a divergence between actual con-
ditions and expectations with respect to the factors enumerated in
the check list. They were also asked to submit any other remarks
which might help to explain the discrepancy.
The explanatory factors mentioned in the responses have been
classified into fifteen categories. In addition to the, eight specific
factors in the check list, seven more were included to cover the sup-
plementary comments. As will be seen from the following discussion,
there may be different influences affecting plant and equipment
expenditures even within the categories used. In some instances it
is possible to segregate these influences on the basis of written
comments or other supplementary information.
The check list requires little clarification. The "sales outlook"
category has been adjusted by the removal for separate considera-
tion of cases in which the change in sales outlook is associated with
a change in competitive conditions and cases in which a new prod-
uct or a change in product mix is involved.
The "current expenses" category covers two situations. In the
first the effect is one of encouraging or discouraging the substitu-
tion of capital for labor, so that current expenses and plant and
equipment expenditures might be expected to move in the same
direction relative to anticipations. In the second situation the change
in current expenses is simply the reason for a change in earnings
and has the same impact as a change in earnings arising from any
other source. This would lead to a change in plant and equipment
expenditures in the opposite direction from the change in current
expenses. The second pattern was the usual' one and was charac-
teristic of fhe cases where earnings or sales were checked as the
principal factor and current expenses as a major factor.
The category "plant and equipment supply situation" includes
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cases in which postwar shortages of capitalgoods eased more rap-
idly than anticipated, as well as cases of routine delays and speed-
ups in the delivery of capital goods on order. The category"plant
and equipment costs" covers cases in which the physical volume of
investment was not particularly affected but prices and hence dol-
lar expenditures were different from those anticipated, and also
cases in which purchases were induced or deferred because of price
changes. The two types of factors under this category operated dif-
ferently on plant and equipment expenditures, but could generally
be distinguished by comments indicating the direction of the dis-
crepancy between actual and anticipated prices of capital goods;
the first type—where physical quantities are not particularly affected
—was somewhat more common during the year covered.'4
2.. OTHER EXPLANATORY FACTORS
The seven explanatory factors which were added to those con-
tained, in the check list are as follows: change in competitive condi-
tions, new product or change in product mix, changes in the
availability of labor or raw, materials, changes in technology,
timing problems, routine under- or overestimates, and miscellane-
ous.'5 In all cases the changes referred to are changes from ex-
pectations.
The category "change in competitive conditions" contains all
cases in which this factor is mentioned, even though sales outlook
may be the factor checked: When competitive conditions are men-
tioned, the pattern of behavior is a fall in sales below anticipations,
accompanied by a rise in plant and equipment expenditures. This
is in contrast' with the parallel movement of sales and capital goods
expenditures which predominates when sales are checked and com-
petitive conditions are not mentioned.
"New product or change in product mix" covers, in about equal
number, cases in which a new product is introduced or the demand
for a new product exceeds expectations, and cases where, in re-
sponse to shifts in demand, the production of certain products is
expanded at the expense of others. However, when the unantici-
Thistypeofcase was definitely more important than the other for new plant
and equipment. However, as an offset there were a number of cases in which
unanticipated purchases of used plant and equipment were made because
bargains became available.
15Changesin competitive conditions and in technology were the only two
of these factors which were suggested in the questionnaire as possible "other"
conditions which might differ from expectations.
83PLANT AND EQUIPMENT PROGRAMS
pated expenditure results from style changes or minor product im-
provements, the classification "routine underestimate" is used.
"Changes in the availability of labor or raw materials" during
1949 applied mainly to strikes. In a couple of cases material short-•
ages were involved.
"Changes in technology" covers the cases in whiéh developments
in production techniques appear to have governed the decision to
spend more or less for plant and equipment than was anticipated.
Process changes and reevaluation from a technological point of
view of proposed equipment purchases are included here.
Under "timing" are included situations in which a proposed in-
vestment expenditure takes more (or in a few cases less) time to
consummate than was anticipated. The time lag generally is that
between the original investment decision and the placing of the
order or contract. No change of decision or intent by the manage-
ment to postpone the project is involved. Delays or speed-ups which
arise from the supply side—from suppiy shortages or the accelera-
tion of deliveries of capital goods already on order—are of course
included under "plant and equipment supply situation" rather
than here.
"Routine under- or overestimate" is intended to apply where the
discrepancy results from a number of small expenditure items
rather than from the initiation or cancellation of any major projects.
The typical pattern here is that the firm estimates a certain lump
sum, not for expenditures specifically in mind at the time, but to
cover replacemeni and miscellaneous needs which will arise dur-
ing the year in the ordinary course of operations. This estimate
may be either too small or too large to take care of the needs which
actually arise.
The miscellaneous category includes a number of subgroups. The
largest of these (the principal factor in 15 cases and a major factor
in 5 cases) contains the firms which simply state that certain proj-
ects were initiated or deferred or canceled without any clear indi-
cation why this decision was made, except for an apparent tendency
to exclude from reported investment programs items whose acqui-
sition is uncertain. The projects here are too large and too specific
for the concept of a routine under- or overestimate to be appro-
priate. A second subgroup (6 cases, all principal) consists of in-
stances in which the discrepancy is purely a matter of accounting
procedure—a decision as to what items of expenditure should be
capitalized and when. In other subgroups the discrepancy is re-
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lated to the sale or dissolution of the business (2 cases), the re-
placement of a major fire loss (2 cases), the decision to buy rather
than lease the needed capital good (4 cases), and clerical errors in
the reporting of actual or anticipated expenditures (6 cases, includ-
ing 5 principal and 1 major). A final subgroup contains, one-of-a-
kind cases not otherwise classified (5 cases).
3. IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT FACTORS
Chart 4 and table 8 indicate the number of firms giving desig-
nated reasons for discrepancies between actual and anticipated ex-
penditures in 1949, segregating firms 'which exceeded investment
plans by at least 25 per cent from those which curtailed plans by
this amount. The table shows the frequency with which each factor
was indicated as being the principal influence, and also the fre-
quency with which it was mentioned as a major influence. For prin-
cipal factors the table shows separately the firms which gave one
reason only and those which indicated major influences in addition
to the principal factor.
A change in the sales outlook was by far the most commonly
mentioned as the reason for a decrease in expenditures below the
level anticipated at the beginning of the year. Unlike the other
reasons given for discrepancies between actual and anticipated ex-
penditures, information does exist on the level of actual and antici-
pated sales for a high proportion of the firms in the survey so that
a quantitative comparison can be made between the discrepancies
in expenditures and the extent to which conditions differed from
expectations with respect to sales.
For the firms mentioning a change in sales outlook as the principal
reason for discrepancies between actual and anticipated expendi-
tures, there was a strong positive correlation between changes in
expenditures and in sales; that is, the larger the discrepancy between
actual and anticipated sales, the larger the corresponding discrep-
ancy' in expenditures. In contrast, there was no such correlation
between discrepancies in expenditures and sales for the firms speci-
fying other reasons for a divergence between actual and anticipated
outlays. For the firms not receiving the special follow-up question-
naire, there was only a slight positive correlation between discrep-
ancies in expenditures and sales.
A second factor of some importance in reducing planned outlays
was a change in the earnings outlook. Changes in the sales and earn-

























Chart4. Frequency Distribution of Explanatory Factors for Changes in In-








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.PLANT AND EQUIPMENT PROGRAMS
counted for nearly half of the cases in which actual expenditures in
1949 were lower than those anticipated.'° These two factors were
also given as reasons for increasing expenditures, but in a much
smaller proportion of the cases. Of the other factors resulting in re-
visions in planned outlays, only three—working capital requirements,
timing, and availability of labor and materials—were clearly more
important on the down than on the up side.
The most significant factors tending to increase planned outlays
were changes in the plant and equipment supply situation, in plant
and equipment costs, in competitive conditions, in new products, in
routine underestimates, and• in miscellaneous influences resulting in
the initiation of substantial new projects. These factors were men-
tioned as the principal motivating forces by 73 per cent of the firms
with expenditures higher than planned, but by only 28 per cent of
the firms with lower expenditures. It is interesting to note that small
routine discrepancies showed a higher relative frequency of in-
creases (compared with decreases) in expenditures than did the
larger discrepancies listed under "miscellaneous."
Changes in the availability of debt and equity financing were
unimportant in altering planned outlays on plant and equipment.
Though stock prices rose considerably during 1949 and equity fi-
nancing was more attractive to business concerns, very few firms
were thereby induced to step up their expenditure programs.
The other two factors listed in the table—changes in current ex-
penses and in technology—also had only a small influence on revi-
sions of planned outlays. Only a few firms were induced to substitute
capital for labor to a significantly greater extent than planned at
the beginning of the year. A somewhat higher proportion of firms
increased their plant and equipment expenditures as a result of
technological developments, but these were offset in large part by
firms which decreased their planned outlays. for the same reason.
4. VERSUS NONCYCLICAL INFLUENCES
The period covered by these qUestionnaire replies obviously af-
fects both the relative frequency with which a specific factor is
16Whenmore than one factor was mentioned by the same firm, a change in
the sales outlook was more frequently associated with a change in the earnings
outlook than with any other factor. Both were, in a number of instances, either
separately or jointly mentioned together with a change in working capital
requirements. It may be noted that changes in the sales and earnings outlooks
accounted for a higher proportion of downward revisions in equipment than
in plant.
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mentioned and, for many of the factors, the relative frequency of
increases compared with decreases in expenditures. The importance
of a number of these factors, as well as the direction of their effect
on expenditures, will vary widely in different stages of the business
cycle.
The effect of changes in the sales and earnings outlooks would
be expected to be completely different in a period of strong infla-
tionary conditions or at other points of the business cycle from what
it was in the very moderate downturn in 1949. Whereas in a down-
turn, orleast in its initial stages, the apparent effect of changes
in these factors for most firms is to lower planned outlays, the reverse
effect is likely in a recovery.
It is more difficult to tell whether the other significant factorsre-
suiting in downward revisions in planned outlays—working capital
requirements, timing, and availability of labor and materials—are
strongly influenced by cyclical movements. Thus to the extent that
the depressing influence of changes in working capital requirements
in 1949 on plant and equipment expenditures was a reflection of
smaller sources of funds from internal operations than had been
anticipated, without a corresponding reduction in needs for funds,
the effect might be assumed to be cyclical and related to sales and
earnings.lr However, it is not easy to determine how the effects of
changes in the availability of funds and changes in needs for funds
net out at cyclical turning points.
Changes in the availability of labor and materials, which tended
to reduce capital expenditures in 1949, presumably have their great-
est effect in a boom period and much less effect in a depression. Of
the important factors depressing investment, oniy timing difficulties
seem to be largely noncyclical in character.
A number of the factors resulting in upward revisions in pro-
grammed expenditures during 1949 were affected to some extent by
cyclical influences. The plant and equipment supply situation is one
such factor, but as a result of the special wartime and postwar de-
velopments the easing of suppiy conditions for capital goods prob-
ably had a more important impact on expenditures in 1949 than
might normally be expected from purely cyclical influences.
Plant and equipment costs also reflect cyclical influences, but
17Itmight be noted that where working capital requirements were men-
tioned as the principal factor inducing a reduction in plant and equipment
expenditures, actual sales during 1949 were lower than those anticipated at the
beginning of the year in half the cases and higher in the other half.
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again it is difficult to infer, from the 1949 experience any normal
cyclical behavior. It is easy enough to describe the behavior of the
two component parts, the first composed of cases in which the an-
ticipated purchase is made but at different cost, the second of cases
in which a purchase is induced or deferred because of change in
costs. However, each of these operates differently on plant and
equipment expenditures, and it is not possible to determine the
relative importance of these two types of cases in various stages of
the cycle. In 1949 the cases in which changed costs did not greatly
affect the physical quantities of purchases were somewhat more im-
portant than cases of the other type in stimulating upward revisions
in programmed expenditures, particularly for new plant and equip-
ment. Apparently, in spite of the slight decline in average costs dur-
ing the year, a sizable number of companies anticipated lower costs
than actually prevailed.'8
Neither the plant and equipment supply situation nor plant and
equipment costs appear to be as strongly dependent on cyclical con-
siderations as the more important factors responsible in 1949 for
downward revisions in programmed expenditures—namely, changes
in the sales and earnings outlooks. Moreover, the other key factors
on the up side—competitive conditions, new products, routine un-
derestimates, and miscellaneous influences resulting in the initiation
of substantial new projects—appear to be even less dependent on
cyclical influences. This is especially true for the last two of these
categories.
The foregoing discussion suggests that while a sizable proportion
of the changes in planned outlays on plant and equipment are at-
tributable to factors whose impact is cyclically determined, there
are other important factors which are largely independent of the
level of business activity. It is not possible without similar data for
a number of periods to appraise the relative importance of the dif-
ferent factors in various stages of the business cycle.
However, in addition to the cyclical influences there is evidence
once again of a systematic tendency on the part of businessmen to
underestimate their plant and equipment expenditures In their pro-
grams for the following year. Among the factors responsible for this
systematic understatement are the omission of many small items of
capital outlay and a tendency to exclude items whose acquisition is
18 The aggregate expenditure figures and data on costs suggest that this
factor may have been much more significant in 1947 and probably was some-
what more signfficant in 1948 and 1950.
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uncertain. These factors help to explain the earlier finding that
nearly three-fifths of all firms included in the OBE-SEC survey un-
derestimated their plant and equipment expenditures in 1949, even
though about the same proportion overestimated their sales.
5.EXPLANATORYFACFORS BY SIZE OF FLRM
Though the data are rather scanty, table 9 suggests that the rela-
tive importance of the various factors in explaining discrepancies
between actual and anticipated expenditures varies by size of firm.
The table presents, for three different size groups of firms, a distribu-
tion of the principal factors which resulted in higher outlays than
anticipated and of those which resulted in lower outlays."
The table indicates that in 1949 changes in the plant and equip-
ment supply situation and in competitive conditions were relatively
much more important in raising expenditures of the smallest firms
than in raising those of the largest firms. Only the smallest firms
mentioned changes in the earnings outlook as a significant factor in
reducing planned outlays.20 The few firms in the total sample which
gave changes in the availability and cost of debt and equity financ-
ing as the primary factor in explaining discrepancies between ac-
tual and anticipated outlays were all relatively small; each had as-
sets of less than $1 million. There were also minor differences among
the three size groups in the apparent effect of technology and new
products.
However, possibly the most interesting difference is the much
greater importance of routine and miscellaneous miscalculations for
medium-sized and small firms than for large firms. For the latter
there is no indication of any net tendency to underestimate plant
and equipment expenditures for these reasons. Of the other factors,
changes in the sales outlook, in working capital requirements, and
in plant and equipment costs had about equal impact on expendi-
tures in all of the size groups.
6.EXPLANATORYFACTORS BY SIZE OF DISCREPANCY
As might be expected, a distribution of the various explanatory
19Thefirms are classified by sales size since this was available in virtually
every case, whereas assets size was available oniy in a much smaller proportion
of the cases. However, a distribution by size of assets seems to show approxi-
mately the same size differences as those depicted in table 9. The data are
inadequate for an industry breakdown.
20Itmay be noted that though most firms in all size groups experienced


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.PLANT AND EQUIPMENT PROGRAMS
factors by the absolute size of discrepancies in plant and equipment
expenditures shows about the same picture as the distribution
by size of firm. For the large absolute discrepancies, routine under-
and overestimates are very unimportant on both sides, and miscel-
laneous, miscalculations, though somewhat more important, cancel
out in their net impact on plant and equipment expenditures.21
7. NONMANUFACTLJFIING FIRMS
Thoughfollow-up questionnaires relating to the reasons for dif-
ferences between actual and anticipated expenditures in 1949 were
sent to nonmanufacturing as well as to manufacturing firms when
actual outlays were more than 25percent higher or lower than
anticipated, it was only for the railroad group that the sample re-
sponse was sufficient to justify separate treatment. For this group,
understatement and overstatement of outlays were equally common.
Changes in the sales and earnings outlooks, changes in working
capital requirements, and timing difficulties tended to reduce
planned investment for railroads as they did for manufacturing
firms. However, changes in the sales outlook were much less im-
portant for the railroads. On the other hand, routine under- or over-
estimates were much more important on the up side, accounting for
well over half of the revisions in planned outlays, but for only a
negligible proportion of decreases. Most other factors were rela-
tively insignificant.
F. Statistical Relationships between Discrepancies and
Explanatory Variables
Four major groups of factors were indicated in the follow-up
responses as reasons for deviations from investment plans: changes
in the sales and profitability picture; changes in the availability of
funds either from internal or from external sources; changes arising
from a variety of reasons not connected with the firm's economic
position, e.g. technological considerations, misjudgments as to tim-
ing, or necessity for unexpected replacement; and changes arising
from the supply side, in the cost and availability of capital goods.
The influence of factors in the first two groups may be investi-
gated further by comparing the observed discrepancies between
21 The situation is different, however, for the large relative discrepancies—
that is, the ratios of absolute discrepancies to anticipated investment—which
represent for the most part small and medium-sized firms and for which the
distribution of explanatory factors is very close to that for all firms.
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actual and anticipated expenditures with the movements in such
variables as sales, profit rates, and various measures of liquidity and
availability of funds.
It should be pointed out that the analysis of deviations from in-
vestment plans in a particular year is a somewhat different problem
from analysis of investment decisions
thetiming of orders and deliveries and the availability of capital
goods are factors which may have considerable effect in explaining
differences between actual and anticipated expenditures in a given
year, but no substantial impact on the total of investment over
somewhat longer periods. Conversely, the record of sales and profit
experience previous to the formulation of the investment program
will be an important determinant of the investment decision, but
subsequent changes in these variables may not contribute as greatly
to the explanation of deviations from the original plan.
1. EFFECrOFCHANCES IN SALES ANDEAIiNINGS
The evidence supplied by the follow-up responses indicates that
changes in sales and earnings subsequent to the formation of the
investmenf plan influence the extent to which 'the plan is realized.
However, the correlation between per cent deviations from antici-
pated expenditures in 1949 and per cent changes in sales either from
expectations or from sales in the previous year was found to be
low.22 The same result holds in 1948 and in 1947.28
A rather large proportion of firms show an increase in capital
outlays above anticipations in spite of a fairly substantiàl decline in
sales. This recalls 'the pattern of behavior found in the follow-up re-
sponses in those cases where a decline in sales was associated with
a change in competitive conditions. It appears that when the com-
petitive situation is an important factor, the investment response to
a decline in sales is opposite in direction to that which ordinarily
occurs. The fact that a negative relationship between these variables
superimposed upon the predominantly positive one is partly re-
sponsible for the unsatisfactory nature of the results obtained.
22 Discrepancies between actual and anticipated investment were measured
relative to gross fixed assets, as well as to anticipations, in studying the influence
of sales movements and other variables which will be considered later. However,.
correlations were not substantially improved when discrepancies were measured
in terms of gross fixed assets.
28 On a quarterly basis the correlation between per cent deviations from
first anticipations and per cent changes in sales from the previous quarter was
also tested and found to be completely insignificant.
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In addition to influencing profit expectations, movements in sales
may reflect changes in the pressure on productive capacity. An at-
tempt was made, however, to find a variable which would be more
adequate than sales for this purpose. The variable used was the ratio
of unfilled orders to sales, but no significant correlation was found
when the changes in this ratio were compared with the per cent
deviations from investment plans.
Movements in earnings, also, were found to contribute little to-
ward the explanation of discrepancies between actual and antici-
pated expenditures. The two income variables tested were the
change in profit rates from the previous year and the difference be-
tween the actual profit rate and an estimate of the expected rate,
obtained by multiplying sales anticipations and the ratio of income
to sales in the previous year.. The correlation in both cases was small.
In evaluating these results it should be recalled that the period
studied was unusual in that a large backlog of demand for plant
and equipment existed, and this may. have diminished the influence
on investment of changes in sales and earnings. On the other hand,
changes in earnings cannot be expected to exert a direct influence
on the realization of investment plans except insofar as the current
profit movements influence fairly long-run profit expectations.24 Even
when the investment under consideration represents expansion, the
current fluctuations in sales and profits may not have a predominant
influence on the expected rate of return. When cost-cutting or the
replacement of obsolescent machinery is involved, or in the case
of a new product, the influence will be even less, since the expected
rate of return is likely to be quite unrelated to overall profit rates
on existing investment.
2. Emcr OF LIQUIDITY
A number of variables relating to liquidity were also tested to
determine their effect on the discrepancies between actual and an-
ticipated investment. It was believed that unexpected decreases in
the liquid funds internally available might contribute to the cur-
tailment of planned investment, since many firms either do not find
external financing available or prefer not to make use of it. To a
lesser extent unexpected increases in liquid assets might lead to an
expansion of investment plans, especially in cases where a desirable
expenditure is being postponed because of a shortage of working
capital.
24 There may also be an indirect effect through resulting changes in liquidity.
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Changes in the ordinary liquidity ratios did not yield satisfactory
results, because unanticipated investment in itself operates to make
the year-end position less liquid than otherwise.25 The resulting
tendency toward a negative correlation between divergences from
planned investment and movements in liquidity ratios apparently
outweighed any influence which increases (or decreases) in liquid-
ity might exercise toward encouraging (or discouraging) investment
expenditures. Only slightly better results were secured by utilizing
an estimate of the unexpected change in liquid funds available from
internal operations. This estimate was obtained by adjusting the dif-
ference between actual profits and the previously discussed estimate
of expected profits for changes in liquidity requirements
alevel of sales and profits different from expectations. A
number of multivariate tests, involving movements in sales or earn-
ings as well as changes in various liquidity ratios, also proved in-
conclusive.
Quite apart from any changes in liquidity, the level of surplus
liquid assets—that is, liquid assets not re4uired for current opera-
tions---might influence the extent to which it is possible to carry
out additional investment expenditures that become desirable dur-
ing the year. The degree of excess liquidity in 1949 was measured
by comparing the ratio of liquid assets to sales with an average of
the corresponding ratios for 1948 and 1941—two years in which
business enterprises as a whole held relatively little in the way of
surplus liquid assets. The correlation between this measure of sur-
pius liquidity and the discrepancy between actual and anticipated
investment was small for the reporting sample as a whole, but
larger for those firms which experienced sizable increases in sales
over anticipations. Such firms presumably had a strong motive for
exceeding their projected investment, and the existence of excess
liquidity apparently had an appreciable effect in encouraging in-
vestment under these circumstances.
25 Among the liquidity variablestested without significantresults were
changes in the following ratios: liquid assets to sales, liquid assets to current
liabilities, current assets to current liabilities, long-term debt to net worth,
long-term debt to common plus preferred stock, interest changes to net income
before interest and taxes, and net current assets to long-term debt. Changes in
the cost of equity capital, as measured by the earnings-price and dividends-
price ratios, were also tested.
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Department of. Commerce Questionnaires
STIONNAIBE ON REASONS FOR CHANGE iN INVESTMENT PLANS
Pleaseindicate below the factors which resulted in a difference between your actual and
anticipated plant and equipment expenditures in 1949:
A.If difference was primarily due to a diverg
expectations with respect to the factors
relative importance of the factors:
encé bet
listed
ween actual conditions and












Plant and equipmentsupply situation *.
Plantand equipment costs (viz., prices p
Availability and cost of debt financing








If difference was not primarily due to a divergence between actual conditions and expectations,
please indicate the reason (or reasons):
Other remarks
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REPORT FORM FOR AND EQUIPMENT EXPENDITURES SURVEY
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
Please mailthis schedule as promptly as possible
sincethe timeliness of the summary we will send
toyou each quarterisdependentupon the date
wereceive reports from companies.
Yourreplies to these questions are strictly con-
fidential.They willbe seen byno one except
thesworn Bureau personnel working on the survey
who are prohibited by law from revealing the in-
formation which you furnish.
Your company name does not appear on this form
as the confidential code numberissufficient
identification for purpose of classification and
tabulation.
SPECIFIC INSTRUCT IONS
Show asmuchof theindicated breakdown asis
iracticable.In allcases give total plant and
equipment expenditures.Estimated amounts may
beused if desired.
"Plantand equipment expenditures"for the re-
porting period consist of additionscompleted
during the period plus construction in. progress
at the end ofthe period, minus construction in
progress at the beginning of the period.
Exclude (1) all expenditures for land.(2) costs
incurredfor maintenance andrepairs,and (3)
expenditures on plant and equipment for use out-
side the continental United States.If it is not
feasible to exclude actual expenditures for these
items, please estimate, or indicate that they are
included.
Report data on a consolidated basis for the cor-
poration and Its subsidiaries wherever possible.
Expenditures refer to all costs during the specified periods (whetheron contract or by your own forces) charge-
able tofixed asset accounts andfor which depreciation accounts areordinarily maintained.For "anticipated
expenditures" show estimates of costs which according to present planning will be incurred during the speciffed
period. If expenditures arenot given below,indicate whether replyIs "None" or whether estimatee are "Not
available".
ITEM
QUARTERLY SURVEY ANNUAL SURVEY I














Expenditures for plant $





$ . $ $
SALES- GIVETHE DOLLARAMOUNTS OF SALESANDRECEIPTS FROM OPERATIONS FOR 1932(actual) AND 1953(anticipated)
ITEM Actual 1952 Anticipated
Net sales and receipts from operations 5 $
Whereverfeasible, report Uata on a calendar year basis.Figures for 1952 arerequestedhere inorder to insure
comparabilityrjth your 1953 anticipations.
COMMENT
• E. M. HooVER, Washington,D.C.
I am confident that the analysis pursued in this paper will
eventually make possible important improvements in forecasts of
business investment, both by survey and by other methods. The
measurement of systematic biases in investment anticipations—biases
related to size of firm or program, seasonal factors, accounting con-
ventions, conservatism in gauging the future, or anything else about
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which we can hope to know something in advance—is an obviously
fruitful line of approach to refinement of the aggregate investment
forecasts.
In addition to making an important contribution along these lines,
the authors seek to relate businessmen's revisions of investment pro-
grams to errors in anticipating sales, prices, profits, and other pre-
sumably relevant causal factors that vary in cyclical or irregular
fashion and are thus relatively unpredictable. In discussing the
limitations on the direct applicability of this second set of findings,
I am merely reinforcing the authors' own expression of caution.
Let us suppose that a number of relationships of the cyclically
irregular type were developed still further by additional studies,
till at last we could be pretty confident of the effect of unanticipated
sales changes, and so on, on revision of investment programs. In
order to use this information to derive an improved forecast of
business investment outlays, we should still need two other kinds
of data:
1. Reports on businessmen's anticipations of sales, prices, profits,
and so on. The OBE-SEC surveys have in fact gathered such in-
formation in respect to sales. Perhaps further use can be made of
corresponding reports on businessmen's anticipations of prices,
profits, and so on, from other surveys such as those, that have been
made by Fortune and Dun & Bradstreet.
2. An estimate of the prospective errors in the aforesaid anticipa-
tions (based on our own presumably superior forecast of what sales,
prices, profits, and so on, will actually do).
With the above information we could then proceed to derive an
improved investment forecast. The steps involved may be illustrated,
as follows, taking just one causal factor (profits) for simplicity's
sake:
1. The automobile manufacturers, say, report that they expect
to spend $1 billion next year on plant and equipment (basis: pres-
ent type of investment-anticipations survey).
2. At• the same time the automobile manufacturers report that
they expect their profits next year to be 10 per cent above this
year's (basis: survey of profit anticipations).
3. We expect that automobile manufacturers' profits will in fact
go up 12 per cent rather than 10 (basis: a forecast of profits re-
garded as more reliable than 2.
4. When profits exceed anticipations by 2 per cent, investment
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outlays tend to exceed anticipations by 5 per cent (basis: analysis
of association of anticipation errors in profits and investment).
5. On the basis of 1 and 4, our improved estimate of automobile
industry investment outlays for next year is $1.05 billion.
The above would obviously be a rather indirect, not to say tortu-
ous way of getting refined investment forecasts; and if I correctly
understand the paper under discussion the authors do not suggest
that we can ever expect much from such a procedure applied to
cyclically irregular variables. The utility of their findings on cycli-
cally irregular factors underlying investment revisions lies perhaps
more in the progressive improvement of our understanding of the
investment process and its determinants.
Here too, however, it may be worth while to underline an essential
point that the authors make. When any given variable—such as
"earnings"—appears prominently in their tabulations of reasons for
changes in investment programs, that prominence reflects both the
importance of the variable as an investment determinant and the
relative difficulty of correctly anticipating the variable. Thus even if
a particular variable were extremely influential with regard to invest-
ment decisions, it would not figure prominently in these tabulations
if it happened to be susceptible of accurate anticipation by business-
men for a year ahead. I should judge that costs of security financing
and technology, for example, would ordinarily be firm enough at
the outset of a year to exclude unforeseen changes in these variables
as important causes of revision of investment programs during the
year.
Much depends, of course, on the length of the period of antici-
pations—which in the investigation under discussion was a year. For
anticipations covering a period of several years, one might expect a
quite different pattern of factors responsible for revisions. Factors
like "timing" and "plant and equipment supply situation" would
presumably be much less important in terms of a longer period such
as this, while unforeseen changes in financing costs and in techno-
logical possibilities would bulk larger.
Let me say again that nothing I have said so far.implies any dis-
agreement with what I understand to be the authors' views. I have
merely tried to underscore some points essential to an evaluation of
their findings.
In my remaining comments I want to raise some queries which the
authors may feel it worth while to answer or discuss:
1. The investigation shows that large investment plans, and in-
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vestment plans of large firms, are anticipated with superior accu-
racy. In view of this finding, would it be desirable to weight the size
strata of the sample in such a way as to give still greater emphasis
to bigger firms and/or bigger programs; or perhaps to cut off the
smaller firms and/or projects altogether? -
2."Working capital needs" are shown as an important reason for
downward revision of plant and equipment investment programs in
1949. Since corporations as a whole needed no funds in 1949 for
working capital expansion—indeed, there seems to have been a net
release of funds—I am surprised to see the working capital require-
ments factor listed as impeding rather than encouraging the ful-
fillment of 1949 -investment plans.
3. As a final suggestion for further discussion, I, for one, should
welcome more specific indication by the authors of some of the
improvements they contemplate in future surveys.
REPLY BY THE Aumons
In connection with Hoover's comments, we feel that several
observations may be in order. As he points out, we are in agreement
that our findings on systematic factors underlying investment re-
visions are much more immediately useful in refining aggregate
investment forecasts than our findings on the relationships of cycli-
cally irregular variables to such revisions. We are also in agreement
that the immediate -utility of our investigation into the latter rela-
tionships lies more in the improved understanding of the invest-
ment process and its determinants.
However, if eventually we are able to develop on the basis of this
type of analysis a fairly stable relationship between actual invest-
ment and both planned investment and such other variables as the
difference between actual and expected profits, it would appear to
us that this information would play a necessary part in the construc-
tion of future economic models in which the levels of investment and
profits (and other relevant variables including total economic ac-
tivity) would be mutually determined. The resulting revision in the
aggregateinvestmentforecast is quite different from the procedure
outlined by Hoover. We are not, of course, prejudging whether
either a satisfactory investment relationship of the type described
can be derived, or, if so, whether it can be used together with such
other relationships as a consumption function and a profits function
to construct a complete model depicting realistically the workings of
the economy.
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We are also in agreement—again as Hoover points out—that even
if a particular variable were extremely influential with regard to
investment decisions, it might not show up prominently in the tabu-
lations of reasons for investment revisions if it were susceptible of
accurate anticipation by businessmen for a year ahead. However, it
does not seem obvious to us that "COStS of security financing .
forexample, would ordinarily be firm enough at the outset of a
year to exclude unforeseen changes in these variables as important
causes of revision of investment programs during the year." Costs of
financing—particularly in the equity markets—can change fairly
rapidly, as historical experience amply demonstrates. Whether the
entire normal range in costs of financing is likely to have much
effect on investment decisions is another question, but one which
can be answered only by such empirical investigations. Similar
questions can be raised with respect to the expected effect on in-
vestment decisions of the many minor as well as major technological
developments.
In connection with the three questions that Hoover raises:
1. We are exploring the desirability of reweighting the sample of
companies reporting anticipated expenditures to give greater weight
to firms (and programs) which have been able in the past to fore-
cast with relative accuracy. Obviously, however, the fact that one
sector of the business population has been able to project its ex-
penditures much more accurately than another does not necessarily
mean that it can be used to project better the expenditures of the
second sector.
2. The tentative explanation we gave for the finding that "work-
ing capital needs" were shown as a fairly important reason fOr down-
ward revision of plant and equipment investment programs in 1949
was the smaller inflow or availability of funds than had been antici-
pated without a corresponding reduction in working capital require-
ments. It is quite plausible, moreover, that while an unanticipated
easing in the working capital position in a year like 1949 would not
constitute a strong inducement to increased expenditures for the
firm involved, an unanticipated tightening in this position for other
firms would lead to a downward revision in expenditures.
3. The improvements we contemplate in future follow-up ques-
tionnaires, apart from coverage of additional periods and more
firms, consist of introduction of items which turned out to be im-
portant factors in investment revisions even though not segregated
in the original follow-up questionnaire, clarification of some of the
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original items, and experimentation with questionnaires which re-
order the check list and which omit the check list. In addition we
plan to obtain additional material on the nature of assumptions made
at the time anticipated expenditures are submitted with respect to
prices and other variables not now covered in the regular annual re-
porting form, and on the mechanics of investment programming.
GEORGE KATONA, University of Michigan
I hardly need to say that I fully approve of the principles under-
lying the OBE-SEC surveys, since the approach to economic re-
search I have used during the past ten years is based on the same
principles. If I may try to formulate the principles of an analysis
of decision formation and of predicting forthcoming trends from
survey data, I would say:
1. Data obtained through questioning the economic agents whose
actions and decisions influence the national economy represent a
necessary supplementation of data that reflect the results of the
past behavior of these agents.
.2. Findings obtained through interrogating the economic agents
should be analyzed in two ways. One should compile aggregate data
by weighting the responses and also present microeconomic distribu-
tions grouping individual answers. Both methods should be applied
to past as well as to forthcoming behavior.
3. The study of the probable causes of economic behavior should
be conducted both by correlation analysis—discovering, for instance,
the relations between expectations and size of firms, size of expendi-
tures, sales, or income—and by asking direct question, "Why?"
The paper by Friend and Bronfenbrenner in the December 1950
Survey of Current Business represents great progress, since it adds
to previously published aggregates some microeconomic distribu-
tions, some results of correlation analysis, and some findings about
why expectations were not fulfilled. In the current paper I especially
welcome the evidence that the method of questioning the economic
actors has proved to be a better predictive instrument than me-
chanical extrapolations from past data.
The authors do not deal explicitly with the basic question of the
meaning of expressed intentions. In this respect I can be very brief,
not only because I discussed the problem extensively in a book re-
cently published but also because Firestone states the same position
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very clearly in his paper.' What businessmen say they intend to do
should not be viewed in itself as a forecast of things to come. Ex-
pectations, intentions, and plans are attitudes, the knowledge of
which is important because they shape behavior. By determining
what people expect and plan and why, we can improve our diag-
nosis, and good diagnosis helps to improve predictions. The most
important prediction we are called to make concerns the question
whether or not there will be a change in trends. To predict, for
example, whether business capital expenditures in the next period
will be much higher, somewhat higher, or somewhat lower than in
the last period is of great importance, of greater importance than
to predict the exact amount of such expenditures. In this respect
the record of the Commerce Department surveys—as shown, for
instance, in Firestone's paper—is most impressive.
But I believe that the authors have not yet made use of all possi-
bilities inherent in the survey approach. Just because the method is
new and important, we need to explore it fully. Furthermore, we
must make use of the best possible techniques and must publish
the data in a way which permits full analysis and criticism by others.
In these respects, in my opinion, much remains to be done, and I
wish to raise a few specific questions.
My first set of questions refers to the form in which the quarterly
and annual surveys have been published during the past few years.
Table 1 of this paper may serve as an illustration: only extrapolated
aggregates—"blow-ups" is the technical term—are published. This is
not sufficient, and the survey method should give us more. Regard-
ing actual capital outlays, we find, for instance, that manufacturers
spent $8,220 million in 1950. We should also like to know the size
distribution of the outlays. How many firms spent over $1 million,
for instance? Furthermore, a Lorenz curve showing the concentra-
tion of outlays would be most useful. Finally, it is not enough to
know the aggregate changes (that capital outlays of manufacturers
were $1 billion higher in 1950 than in 1949); we should also like to
know how many firms have increased their capital outlays and by
how much, and how many have decreased them and by how much.
Concerning anticipated expenditures, such distributions assume
a still greater importance. We need to know more than that the 1951
anticipations are x per cent higher than the 1950 expenditures. What
1SeeGeorge Katona, Psychological Analysis of Economic Behavior (McGraw-
Hill, 1951), pp. 174ff. and, concerning the capital-outlay surveys, pp. 323ff.
See also 0. J. Firestone's paper in this volume, pp. 140-141.
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is the number of firms whose 1951 plans exceed their 1950 expendi-
tures, and what is the number of firms whose plans are smaller?
And what are the amounts of changes? Trend data of this kind may
be helpful in predicting changes. Furthermore, from the point of
view of economic theory the relation of such data to other variables,
such as the trend of sales, is of great interest.
Naturally, such distributions can be presented only if the sample
is representative. Unfortunately, the information given about the
sample is far from complete.2 We need to know what part of the
extrapolated aggregates is derived from the survey and how the
rest is estimated. Furthermore, we need information about the rate
of nonresponse and its treatment.
The second type of question I want to raise refers to the form of
inquiry about anticipated capital outlays. The questionnaire mailed
to the respondents has not been published. The title of one blank
reads: "Survey of 1949 Business Budgets." The instruction says:
"Give the amounts which you plan at this time to spend for con-
struction and equipment during the calendar year 1949. If exact
amount has not been determined, please estimate." The question
is how the people who fill out these blanks understand these words.
Suppose a firm has no capital budget, or its budget has not yet been
approved by the board of directors; what does it do? Projects under
way and contracts already awarded will undoubtedly be included,
but what is the treatment of needs, hopes, and desires?
It is well known that the greatest drawback of mail questionnaires
is that they must be brief and simple. From a recent survey consist-
irig of detailed personal interviews with top executives of manu-
facturing firms, we know that some capital expenditure plans are
discussed in terms of contingencies and uncertainties.3 The words
depends on occur frequently.If such and such occurs, we shall
build a new plant" is the type of answer received in some personal
interviews. The fate of such answers when used in filling out the
Commerce Department blank is something we ought to know. Also,
the frequency of contingent answers in itself is an important trend
indicator. What follows is, I think, that the simple mail question-
naires need to be supplemented by personal interviews. These could
also clarify another crucial question: Who fills out the blanks in
2 It consists of information that 1,000 corporations registered with the SEC
and more than 1,000 unregistered manufacturing concerns are canvassed.
See George Katona and J. N. Morgan, "The Quantitative Study of Factors
Determining Business Decisions," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. xxvi
(1952), pp. 67ff.
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large and small plants—the president, the chief accountant, or who
else?
Now I turn to my third and last set of questions referring to the
form of inquiry about divergences between expressed expectations
and their fulfillment. Much of the paper before us is based on an-
swers received from 305 firms to a check list mailed out. The blank
as formulated puts the respondents on the defensive. They are told
that their anticipations were wrong and are asked to explain why.
On top of the check list the following phrase is printed: "Conditions
differed from expectations with respect to."4 This formulation is
based on the assumption, which I believe to be incorrect, that all
firms have definite expectations with regard to each of the factors
mentioned: sales outlook, current expenses, net earnings, and so on.
Furthermore, one would expect that at ,least some firms would
choose the easiest way out and explain their failure to fulfill their
anticipations by factors which do not put them in a bad light. Thus
we find in table 8 that not a single firm explained spending less
than anticipated by unavailability of capital. Naturally, we have
no record of anybody saying, "We wanted to spend $100,000 more,
but the directors forbade it," or, "We never really planned to spend
so much; our estimate was a mistake."
The findings concerning spending more than anticipated are
somewhat unexpected. The two most frequent specific causes of
spending more than anticipated are changes "in plant and equip-
ment supply situation" and "in plant and equipment costs." As far
as we know from other sources, the changes in these respects could
not have been radical in 1949. Already at the beginning of 1949
the supply situation in building materials and machine tools was
rather good. On the other hand, we have evidence from our surveys
that in the summer and fall of 1949 businessmen were much more
optimistic regarding future sales and profits than at the beginning
of the year. But it is not to be expected that presidents of large
corporations would put down in writing, "At the beginning of 1949
we expected a depression; when consumer expenditures held up
very well, we were proved to be wrong." Although I advocate per-
sonal interviewing in place of the check list method for studying
The blanks also contain two phrases under the check list, namely, "If dif-
ference was not primarily due to divergence between actual conditions and
expectations, please indicate the reason (or reasons)" and "Other remarks."
This does not detract much from the suggestive influence of the check list.
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motivational factors, I want to say that even in personal interviews
you hardly ever get such admissions. People remembertheir pre-
dictions which came true and forget very fast those which proved
to be erroneous. What other method of analyzing changes in moti-
vation is available? We may ask people, when they express their
intentions, about the reasons they have for making their plans. And
we may ask them a year later, without reference to what they said
before, why they did what they did.
Another' surprising finding is that anticipations regarding plant
expenditures proved to be less accurate than anticipations regard-
ing expenditures on new equipment. It is explained on pages 76 and
77 that when changes in plans to build plants occur, they are likely
to be substantial. But why do such occur more frequently
than changes regarding new equipment? This again is a point on
which personal interviewing may shed light.
I have stressed points of methodology in my remarks because of
our very great need for further research in this field. But the points
I raised are related to basic theoretical questions. Two of these un-
solved questions may be mentioned briefly. We read in the intro-
ductory statements by Friend and Bronfenbrenner that "capital out-
lays...dependon business expectations" (page 57). That capital
outlays depend on expected profits, sales, interest rates, and so on
is a generalization frequently found in textbooks. Yet it is possible,
and is confirmed by our studies, that only some capital outlays de-
pend on expectations while others do not. We need further studies
on this point.5
It is also implied by Friend and Bronfenbrenner and frequently
stated in textbooks that capital outlays are less tied down to current
income than is consumption, the other major type of private
expenditure. But suppose we list four major types of private ex-
penditures instead of two (investment and consumption), namely,
business capital outlays, business outlays for material and labor,
consumer purchases of durable goods, and consumer expenditures
for nondurables and services. Then the results may be different. We
do not know which, business capital outlays or consumer spending
The role of expectations in economic behavior has been discussed in George
Katona, "Expectations and Decisions in Economic Behavior," in Lerner and
Lasswell, eds., The Policy Sciences (Stanford University Press, 1951). Regard-
ing habitual capital expenditures, not based on definite expectations and on
careful weighing of alternatives, see the article in the Quarterly Journal of
Economics mentioned above, especially p. 90.
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on durables, is less tied down to current income. In this respect again
we need empirically verified generalizations.
The Commerce Department and the SEC in their capital-outlay
surveys are pioneering in an important field and have been very
successful. I may summarize my emphasis on the need for further
methodological research and additional analysis by saying that
pioneers have responsibilities and that success imposes certain obli-
gations.
REPLY BY THE AUTHORS
Katona raises three sets of questions, which we shall attempt to
answer briefly.
The first set relates mainly to the desirability of additional distri-
butional data and secondarily to a more complete discussion of the
nature of the sample. The additional distributions suggested by
Katona are somewhat outside the orientation of this paper insofar
as they deal with trend patterns in investment rather than with the
relation of business programs for a given period to actual invest-
ment in that period. This is, of course, no argument against the
importance and relevance of such distributions for economic analy-
sis, though questions of cost must certainly be balanced against the
potential usefulness of any proliferation of distributional data. Some
information on the specific points Katona raises may be obtained
from table 3, where the marginal totals give a frequency distribu-
tion of per cent changes in capital outlays from 1948 to 1949, and
from the discussion on page 68 of dollar variations of 1949 invest-
ment both from anticipations and from 1948 expenditures.
So far as the sample is concerned, considerably more elaborate
descriptions are available than that quoted in Katona's footnote. The
extent of coverage has varied over the postwar period, with the
latest discussion appearing in the December 1951 Survey of Cur-
rent Business. An earlier description of the sample appeared in the
January 1946 Survey. The sample has no claim to randomness in
view of its partial dependence on the willingness of firms to co-
operate. However, the coverage in terms of assets is large, and for
actual investment, where independent estimates are available, the
agreement with these external data seems to be close, particularly
in movement. (For manufacturing see the December 1951 Sur-
vey.) A complete reconciliation of the plant and equipment series
with related construction and producers' durable equipment corn-
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ponents of the gross national product, as adjusted to the new Census
bench mark, has not yet been published.
The second set of questions refers to the form of the question-
naires on anticipated capital outlays. Katona makes the point that
there is no way of knowing to what extent the reported anticipa-
tions include "needs, hopes, and desires" in addition to "projects
under way and contracts already awarded." Ideally, we wish to
know the probability of each contingent expenditure and the fac-
tors upon which it depends. One step in this direction has been the
inclusion of anticipated sales in the regular annual questionnaires,
since the level of sales is one of the major factors likely to affect
contingent investments and also one regarding which businessmen
generally are willing to quantify their expectations. An attempt was
also made on the basis of small samples of personal interviews to
determine the availability of such information as a three-way break
separating from other projects, first, those already contracted for
and, second, those not contracted for but to which a very high
probability is attached in the absence of sharp deviations from pres-
ent expectations. The results of these small sample tests were very
unsatisfactory, though further study is certainly indicated.
The third set of questions relates to the form of the inquiry about
divergences between programmed and realized investment. We feel,
first of all, that an examination of the letter accompanying the ques-
tionnaires as well as the questionnaire itself casts doubt on the argu-
ment that the firms were placed on the defensive. We further dis-
agree with the suggestion that the wording of the check list implies
an assumption that all firms have definite expectations with regard
to each of the factors. The assumption is merely that some firms
have definite expectations about some of the factors; and even here
"definite expectation" should be understood to imply a range, per-
haps not very precisely defined, rather than a single number.
As regards the possible unwillingness of firms to give certain
types of reasons for deviations from plan, such as the unavailability
of capital or a mistake in the estimation of requirements, we should
like to make two points. First, the fact that the unavailability of
equity capital was not mentioned as a reason for curtailing pro-
grams' constitutes no clear evidence of the kind of bias Katona sug-
gests, in view of the very small proportion of firms depending on
1Wepresume that Katona's remark refers to equity capital only, since some
firms did indicate that the uiiavailability or cost of debt financing was the cause
of decreased outlays.
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external, equity financing and the improbability of short-term
changes in the availability of capital to particular firms. This is not
to deny that under certain conditions there may be cost fluctuations
in the capital market which discourage some marginal projects, but
in this case it is hard to see why the firms affected should be re-
luctant to state the facts frankly. Second, we should like to point out
that, in spite of Katona's presumption to the contrary, several firms
were in fact willing to indicate that the figures they reported had
simply been bad estimates.
Katona also comments on the fact that changes in the supply
situation and in plant and equipment costs were frequently men-
tioned as reasons for increased expenditures, even though evidence
from other sources indicates that the changes in these respects
could not have been radical in 1949. In this connection itis im-
portant to remember that the supply situation eased more slowly
for small firms than for large ones and that it was primarily small
firms which mentioned the supply situation as a factor inducing
increased expenditures in 1949. As regards the effect of plant and
equipment costs, it appears from the written comments that even
though the general trend showed little upward movement, still there
were substantial price rises for some equipment items, resulting in
increased dollar outlays, as well as cases in which lower prices
encouraged additional expenditures. We fail to understand Katona's
suggestion that the increases in expenditures attributed to these
causes may actually have been due to greater optimism regarding
sales in the summer and fall of 1949 than prevailed at the be-
ginning of the year. First, as mentioned in the paper, in three-fifths
of the cases sales in 1949 actually fell below anticipations as re-
ported at the beginning of the year. Second, a considerable per-
centage of firms did' attribute an increase in expenditures to the
fact that their sales held up better than expected. And third, a very
substantial number of firms attributed curtailments of program to
the fact that sales fell short of anticipations, though it might be ex-
pected businessmen would be even less willing to admit an
error in this direction.
In connection with Katona's general theoretical point that "only
some capital outlays depend on expectations while others do not,"
it appears to us that any capital expenditure, even for replacement,
must depend to some extent on expectations regarding the future,
though these expectations need not, of course, involve any change
from the present situation. Katona may mean that there are some
110PLANT ANDEQUIPMENTPROGRAMS
capital outlays which are insensitive to wide variations in expecta-
tions, but this is in no way inconsistent with our discussion.
•Regarding the relative impacts of income on private investment
and consumers' durables, we do not care to make a judgment. The
statement contained in our paper referred to consumption as a
whole in comparison with investment.
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